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1
Introduction
On March 1, 1919, thirty-three religious Korean leaders gathered in the T’aehwagwan
restaurant in Seoul to officially promulgate a Declaration of Independence with their signatures.
Korea had been formally annexed by Japan in 1910 but had held a colonial status under Japanese
rule since 1905. The declaration signers intentionally chose the date of March 1st in order to
capitalize on the masses of citizens coming to Seoul to observe the scheduled funeral rites of
King Kojong, the last reigning monarch of Korea, which were to take place on March 3, 1919.
With the announcement of the declaration, they proclaimed Korea an independent nation,
authoritatively free from Japanese rule. Simultaneously, students had congregated in Pagoda
Park to hear their own reading of the declaration. Shortly after the reading, the students marched
through the streets in a peaceful movement, yelling “Tongnip manse!” (Long live Korean
independence!)1 With these actions, the March First Movement, “the greatest mass movement of
the Korean people in all their history,”2 officially began.
Drafted in a couple days by twenty-nine year old Ch’oe Namsǒn (1890-1957), the Korean
Declaration of Independence professed the right of the Korean people to determine their own
national existence.3 The opening paragraph of the Declaration states,
We hereby declare that Korea is an independent state and that Koreans are a
self-governing people. We proclaim it to the nations of the world in affirmation of the
principle of the equality of all nations, and we proclaim it to our posterity, preserving in
perpetuity the right of national survival. We make this declaration on the strength of five
thousand years of history, as an expression of the devotion and loyalty of twenty million
people. We claim independence in the interest of the eternal and free development of our
people, and in accordance with the great movement for world reform based upon the
awakening conscience of mankind. This is a clear command of Heaven, the course of our
times, and the legitimate manifestation of the right of all nations to coexist and live in
harmony. Nothing in the world can suppress or block it.4
The opening lines of the Declaration reveal the intentions behind the March First Movement.
The signers wanted self-determined independence of Korea to be immediately implemented.
Because of the Movement leaders’ urgency, the Declaration did not blame Japan for any
grievances or past transgressions against the Korean people. However, it did briefly acknowledge
the treatment of Koreans by the Japanese. The Declaration describes its perspective as follows:
We do not intend to accuse Japan of infidelity for its violation of various solemn treaty
obligations since the Treaty of Amity in 1876. Japan’s scholars and officials, including
indulging in a conqueror’s exuberance, have denigrated the accomplishments of our
ancestors and treated our civilized people like barbarians. Despite their disregard for the
ancient origin of our society and for the brilliance of the spirit of our people, we shall not
blame Japan; we must first blame ourselves before finding fault with others. Because of
1
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the urgent need for remedies for the problems of today, we cannot afford the time for
recrimination over past wrongs.5
Thus, immediate remedies to the oppressive colonization were deemed more important than
inciting revenge or violence against Japan. In other words, the declaration was intended to incite
a peaceful Movement for independence by the Korean people.6
Promptly after reading the Declaration of Independence in the T’aehwagwan, the
thirty-three signers informed Japanese authorities of their actions and were arrested. They had
planned on turning themselves in, under the belief that the “independence movement they had
launched [would] be carried forward first of all by the students and then be spread by the entire
people.”7 The planned gathering of students in Pagoda Park had started the demonstrations, and
by March 5th, “shopkeepers, farmers, laborers, and other citizens [had] joined in.”8 The leaders’
plan had come to fruition. The demonstrations for independence rapidly reached outside of
Seoul, moving “south to Pusan by March 11, and north to Chientao by March 13.”9 The
independence demonstrations also spread overseas to Manchuria, the Russia Maritime Territory,
and Hawaii.10 In total, the Movement amassed over two million Korean participants who
demonstrated in 1500 protests throughout 211 of the 218 county administrations.11
This independence movement came from a combination of various influences: the harsh
and structured colonization that Korea had been enduring under Japan since 1910, the spread of
anti-imperialist global ideology after World War I, and the prior establishment of Protestant
missionaries and schools throughout Korea. Before the March First Movement, there had been
two non-violent attempts by Koreans to connect with the international community and appeal for
Korea's independence.12 These failed attempts will be discussed to frame Korea’s position in the
international community prior to the Movement, and demonstrate how they also may have
motivated the Movement to occur when it did. After World War I, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen
Points speech was going to guide negotiations in Paris. At the Paris Peace Conference, three
Korean representatives’ petitions for independence were ignored. This was Korea’s last attempt
to appeal for independence. Because of this last rejection from the international community and
the masses of people coming to Seoul for national mourning, Korean leaders were compelled to
use this opportune moment to showcase their discontentment.
The other aspect of the anti-imperial ideology that will be a focus for examination is the
presence and role of Protestant missionaries in Korea prior to and during the March First
Movement. Missionaries primarily distributed Westernized education and ideas throughout
Korea. In doing so, a national anti-Japanese consciousness was formed, and the March First
Movement leaders capitalized on that sentiment. While some missionaries outwardly opposed
Japanese colonization practices and directly aided the Movement, missionary organizations
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demonstrated a reluctance to address or engage in the political issues the Movement raised.13
However, it is clear that this Movement would not have been as widespread or inclusive without
the vital influence of these missionaries, and that will be highlighted in this paper.
The huge scale of this independence movement shocked Japanese authorities, who
quickly worked to suppress the effort. The suppression of the Movement was brutal and utilized
Japanese police forces, gendarmerie, and even troops of the army and navy.14 Reports from
Japanese authorities recorded “46,948 demonstrators arrested, 7,509 killed, and 15,961 injured”
during the Movement.15 Additionally, “715 houses were destroyed or burned,” along with 47
churches, and two schools.16 It is likely that these reports from Japanese authorities do not fully
reflect the reality and cruelty of the suppression efforts by the Japanese colonial government. The
true numbers are probably much higher. Ultimately, though, the Japanese suppressed the
Movement and Korea did not receive enough support from the international community. While
the March First Movement had demonstrated Korean anger over the realities of colonizations
and aspirations for independence, it failed to achieve or implement its goal of independence for
the Korean people. Colonial control was not lifted under Japan’s defeat at the end of WWII in
1945.
This paper intends to demonstrate that Korea’s March First Movement of 1919 was
evoked by an amalgamation of factors; specifically, Japan’s influence was never accepted by
Korea, so the combination of harsh Japanese colonization practices, anti-imperial global
ideology after WWI, and the establishment of Protestant missionaries and education in Korea all
pushed Korean leaders to create an independence movement which quickly spread throughout
the entire country. An overview of Japan’s relations with Korea leading to colonization is
provided to help contextualize how these factors emerged and conjoined together to incite the
Movement.
Literature Review
There are a growing number of scholarly works that present compelling arguments about
the origins of the March First Movement. However, not many comprehensive Korean histories
had been written until the 1960s, when scholar Ki-baek Lee released his work Han’gusksa Sillon
(A New History of Korea) in 1961, with major revisions in 1967 and 1976. In 1984, Edward W.
Wagner translated the work into English. This translation has offered English readers an
extensive work about Korean history and culture from the earliest times until 1960. While this
work is important and a crucial contribution to the historiography of Korean history, its analysis
of the March First Movement’s origins suffers because of its attempt to cover the entirety of
Korean history until its publishing year. Lee’s is not a work about the March First Movement and
its inspirations; it is a work about Korean cultural history. In this way, his analysis of the
Movement’s origins does not intend to be comprehensive.17
13
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Other scholarly English works that grapple with the colonization of Korea exist, but they
mainly provide Japanese perspectives. While these works help shed light on Japanese colonial
practices, motivations, and even the language of power used by the Japanese, the Korean voice is
often lost in English scholarly works. These works also tend to focus on one aspect of the
Movement’s origins: Japanese harsh colonial practices. They do not provide a comprehensive
study into the Movement’s beginnings, inspirations, and aftereffects.18 In that respect, there
seems to be a big gap in understanding the causes of the Movement in scholarly work about
Korean history, especially in English works. While there are certainly dissertations and other
works that focus on a single aspect of the March First Movement, such as the link between the
Movement and specifically British missionaries, or the link between the Movement and
Wilsonianism, there appears to be no English study that combines all of the influences of the
Movement into a single piece of work.19 Although these works provide insight about a particular
aspect of the Movement's causes, the Movement’s complexity is better understood through a
consideration of all of these forces. In that respect, the March First Movement has been
neglected by scholars even though it is such an important Movement in the modern history of
Korea. This study, then, serves to fill that scholarly gap and contribute to the contemporary state
of scholarly work on Korea as a comprehensive but critical history into the Movement’s
inspirations.
A striking part of my research process was the lack of translated primary sources about
the March First Movement. In that way, I must acknowledge that my work has been limited in its
ability to write about the leaders of the movement, among other subjects. Despite these
the origins of the March First Movement. Lee credits Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination as the sole catalyst for
the Movement, briefly describes the role of missionary education in Korea, and gives an in-depth account of the
Japanese colonization of Korea. Lee’s book is a crucial source in any historical research surrounding the March First
Movement, and Korean history in general. However, Lee’s work is primarily a Korean perspective, and fails to
account for the nuanced Japanese motivations behind colonization. It is also a work with comprehensive
descriptions of Korean historical events, and thus, is less dedicated to analytical interpretations. This could certainly
be due to the fact that Lee covers the entirety of Korean history until its publishing year, from the Paleolithic Age to
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challenges, this work seeks to provide a more comprehensive study of the March First
Movement by providing the original ideology behind the Movement, how those ideas were
dispersed throughout colonized Korea, and an account of the Movement itself.
The Opening of Japan
Prior to the late 1850s, Japan was a feudal and self-isolated society. Japan’s little Western
contact was with the Dutch, who had been allowed a single trading ship annually at the port of
Nagasaki since 1790.20 Otherwise, Japan was a closed country, seemingly uninterested in
engaging with the existing global trade network. However, during the late 1850s, various
Western powers were looking to expand their trading and their colonies. This desire was
demonstrated through the complex network of unequal treaties European powers had
meticulously constructed for other non-European states. These treaties included privileges such
as extraterritoriality, fixed tariffs, the opening of treaty ports, and the most-favored-nation clause.
These treaties were extremely one sided, and worked to limit the powers of the nations they were
imposed upon. They were enforced in a pattern that was applied to “Persia in 1836 and 1857, to
Turkey in 1838 and 1861, to Siam in 1855, and, most importantly, to China in 1842 and 1858.”21
In particular, the United States began to have a prominent interest in Japan, viewing the
country as “a tantalizingly mysterious closed empire… an untapped potential trading partner,
[and] a prospective market with a population larger than the United States.”22 This resulted in
American and European “warships [beginning] to arrive off Japan’s coastline.”23 Under threat of
war, and after some two years of negotiation, Japan finally agreed to unequal Western terms in
the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1858), which was negotiated between Japan and the United
States. Also referred to as the Harris Treaty, this agreement opened five Japanese ports to U.S.
trade and granted extraterritoriality to U.S. citizens.24 The Harris Treaty was not only the first
time Japan became involved in global trade, but also established a foundational trade agreement
that guided later unequal treaties that Japan signed with other European nations.25
Various Japanese responses arose during the two years of negotiation over the Harris
Treaty. Japanese nationalists rallied against the treaty as an “insulting infringement of national
sovereignty,”26 while others saw it as an opportunity for Japan to advance globally. Etō Shinpei, a
Saga samurai, wrote in a detailed memorandum in 1856 to document his conversion from
supporting exclusion policies to embracing opening policies.27 Etō was a member of the
Tokugawa shishi, a group of samurai who saw themselves as men of action and whose
assasination squads were destabilizing the Tokugawa shogunate. In the memorandum, Etō
compared the feasibility of exclusion by Japan during the seventeenth century to the growing
power of the contemporary West. Ultimately, he concluded that Japan could not stay closed
20
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because of the strength Western nations were showing, but had to be cautious when opening. He
argued that Japan required a plan to not only utilize the talent and knowledge of the Japanese, but
to also seek out knowledge and talent worldwide. According to Etō, whatever excellence that
might be found in “tools, in arms, in medicine, in land development, in astronomy” should be
used by Japan to develop national strength and wealth. By creating and enforcing policies that
utilized this new knowledge, Japan would develop into a powerful country that could “defeat any
enemy and [be] strong enough to expand.”28
Therefore, the growing strength of Western nations had prompted Japanese thoughts
about competition and protection. This kind of thinking was present among Tokugawa shishi like
Etō, and many similar notes and thoughts were written throughout the late Tokugawa period.29
Etō’s memorandum then demonstrates two main ideas held by Japanese citizens at the time: that
Japan would benefit greatly from opening itself as many Western nations had, and that by
emulating Western techniques, Japan could become just as wealthy and powerful as other
Western nations. Emulation had been perceived by the Japanese as the “remaining option” after
“[direct] resistance to the West was quickly seen to be futile and dangerous.”30 Etō’s
memorandum is just one example of the many Japanese citizens and leaders who considered the
vast benefits Japan would experience through emulation.31
The Opening of Korea
Similar to Japan, Korea was a feudal and isolated state for centuries. However, during the
seventh century the Korean kingdom of Silla entered into an alliance with the T’ang dynasty of
China. Afterwards, Korea became “skilled at adapting Chinese institutions to their own needs.” 32
After the Mongol conquest of Korea in 1270, Korea was under more direct imperial control of
China because Goryeo princes began marrying Mongol princesses. When the Joseon (Chosŏn)
dynasty (1392-1897) was established, however, Korea became a nominal tributary state of China
from 1401 until 1882.
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which overthrew the last of the shoguns, the new
Japanese government immediately declared its intention to “conduct itself with all nations
‘according to international law.’”33 The Meiji Council of State began issuing instructions
concerning foreign relations to the young emperor. Subsequently, the Charter Oath was drafted in
April of 1868, which contained five principles to be upheld. Most notably, the fifth principle
stated, “We shall seek knowledge throughout the world and thus invigorate the foundations of
this imperial nation.”34 Thus, the new Meiji government was focused on improving Japan’s
global position and becoming an imperialist nation.
During the Meiji period, Japan made efforts to open new and direct dealings with Korea.
Specifically, in 1876, Japan secured the Treaty of Kanghwa with Korea’s Joseon government.35
28
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This treaty resulted from a series of events that emulated the Western pattern of forcibly opening
countries to trade. Known as the Unyō Incident, in 1875, the Japanese sent the navy ship Unyō to
the waters off Kanghwa Island. This ship was promptly fired upon by the Korean defenders
stationed at the Ch’ojijin barriers.36 While the Japanese government claimed the incident was
provoked by Korea and the Unyō was on a peaceful mission, it was later revealed that the ship’s
commander had been given orders to “create some sort of incident.”37
Shortly after, Japan appointed Kuroda Kiyotaka as a minister spokesperson and sent him
to Korea. Kuroda arrived at the Kapkot promontory, located on the east coast of Kanghwa, with a
squadron of two warships and three troop transports consisting of around four hundred soldiers.38
When he arrived, Kuroda demanded Korea enter into treaty negotiations with Japan. While a
majority of Korean high officials urged that there should be no discussions with the Japanese,
Third State Councilor Pak Kyu-su was convinced by Japanese translator-interpreter O
Kyŏng-sŏk to “adopt a policy of trade and amicable relations.”39 Korea then negotiated a treaty
with Minister Kuroda, now known as the Treaty of Kanghwa.
The Treaty of Kanghwa included twelve articles. Most notably, one of the articles
proclaimed that Korea, as an autonomous nation, “possessed equal sovereign rights with
Japan.”40 This article assured that Japan was not going to be aggressive towards Korea’s
sovereignty, but this acknowledgement of Korea as an autonomous nation was strategic. The
underlying Japanese motive behind this article was to deter interference from China, whose
suzerainty claims over Korea the treaty had then rejected.41 Another article stipulated that Korea
would open a total of three ports to Japan, including Pusan, within twenty months after signing.
This became the most important feature of the treaty because Japan was able to choose specific
ports to open that would be the most beneficial. This discretion and control allowed Japan to
choose the Bay of Wǒnsan to open, precisely selected to “block Russia’s southward advance.”42
Additionally, the treaty allowed the Japanese to “survey Korean coastal waters at will” and
permitted extraterritoriality to Japanese citizens, “authorizing the establishment of Japanese
settlements on land to be leased in the opened ports, with their Japanese residents subject to
Japanese law as applied by Japanese courts.”43 These special privileges allowed Japanese
residents in Korean sovereign territory to be governed by Japan’s laws. As a result of this treaty,
Japanese diplomats and merchants began moving into extraterritorial settlements in Korea.
Again, emulating a Western practice, Japanese troops were stationed to protect these
compounds.44
Thus, the Unyō Incident was a designed scenario by the Japanese which forced Korea
into treaty negotiations and effectively opened Korea. The Treaty of Kanghwa was an unequal
treaty, and closely emulated the Harris Treaty that had been imposed on Japan. Japan’s
aggressive intent was clear through its use of warships to provoke the Unyō Incident, and the
treaty demonstrates how Japan approached its relations with Korea from the perspective of
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advancing its intentions of military, political, and economic aggression.45 The Treaty of Kanghwa
also held great historical significance for Korea because it was the first time Korea was brought
onto the international stage. The opening of Korea led to the beginning of gradual trade with
Western powers and the introduction of Western civilization to Korean society. More
significantly, Japan and China began competing over the newly opened nation.
Competition Between China and Japan Over Influence in Korea
I. The Military Mutiny of 1882
Two specific situations highlight the competition between China and Japan over
influence in Korea and demonstrate Korea’s resistance towards solely Japanese influence.
Because of Korea’s history as a tributary state of China, Korea looked to China for support
during these two instances. The first incident was the Military Mutiny (Imo Mutiny) of 1882,
which resulted in the strengthening of China’s position in Korea. After the Treaty of Kanghwa
was finalized in 1876, Korea sent Kim Koeng-jip that same year on a mission to investigate
progress in Japan. For four years, Kim observed the developments ensuing in Japan and
worldwide, cultivating a desire in him to enlighten Korea. When he left Japan in 1880, Kim
acquired a copy of a treaty titled “A Policy for Korea,” written by Huang Tsun-hsien, a Chinese
legation counselor in Tokyo.46 Similar to Etō Shinpei’s memorandum regarding Tokugawa Japan,
Huang argued that Korea would become a stronger nation by adopting Western institutions and
technology. “A Policy for Korea” became a significant factor that contributed to the later mutiny.
Other Koreans were sent to Japan in a gentlemen’s sightseeing group on an inspection
mission.47 This group traveled throughout Japan for over seventy days with the purpose of
surveying a multitude of Japan’s modernized facilities. In Japan, the group inspected a wide
range of facilities including administrative agencies, military facilities, educational complexes,
and industrial facilities as well.48 Simultaneously, at the urging of the Qing government, Korea
sent a large group of students from yangban families (the highest social class in the Joseon
dynasty) and artisans to Tientsin on a mission. While in China, the group was taken to the
Chinese government arsenal where they studied military applications of basic science and
modern weapon manufacture.49 Korea was making a conscious and discernible effort to become
familiar with modern advances. With all of this new knowledge, Korea began enacting
enlightened governmental reforms. While King Kojong became specifically interested in military
reforms, other administrative reforms that dealt with foreign relations and affairs were enacted.
New agencies were created, such as foreign trade, production, shipbuilding, military munitions,
and machinery.50
However, when Kim Koeng-jip had brought back “A Policy for Korea,” King Kojong
had the treatise copied and distributed to the public. This was an effort to open the eyes of the
Confucian literati who opposed the enlightenment policy. After the distribution, opposing
memorials began streaming into the government. Defenders of Joseon’s traditional ways were so
outraged that they turned to the Taewŏn’gun, the father of King Kojong. The Taewŏn’gun took
advantage of this situation and began to make plans to bring himself back into power.
45
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King Kojong had invited an elite unit of Japanese military officers to Korea to train a unit
of Korean soldiers. These Japanese forces were to be treated favorably, with the best food and
provisions being provided for them. Simultaneously, regular Korean troops received rice, which
were bags of rice mixed with sand to make the rations seem more plentiful. This difference in
provisions created an anti-Japanese sentiment among Korean troops, and further exacerbated the
situation. The anti-Japanese attitudes held by the traditional Korean troops, Taewŏn’gun’s efforts
to take over, and the tension between conservative and enlightenment advocates, were enough to
bring about the mutiny. Because of the new military reforms, traditional military units were
going to be completely eliminated from Korea’s forces. Consequently, old line units had not been
given their pay or ration for around thirteen months.51 When several transports carrying rice
taxes from Chŏlla were in route to Seoul, it was decided that these funds were going to be used
to first pay the soldiers. When the transports arrived at the Sŏnhyench’ŏng (the office created to
administer the Uniform Land Tax Law), the depot clerks took the rations for their own profit.
The superintendent of operations of the Sŏnhyench’ŏng and Queen Min’s nephew, Min
Kyŏm-ho, had also taken the rice for his own use. Infuriated, the cheated soldiers fought the
ration clerks, causing Min Kyŏm-ho to arrest and sentence the ringleaders of the soldiers to
death.52 In light of this news, the soldiers stormed Min Kyŏm-ho’s house, consequently forcing
him to flee to the palace for protection.53
The soldiers sought out the support of the Taewŏn’gun, who proceeded to meet in secret
with the leaders of the mutiny. He had his own trusted subordinates instruct the soldiers’
actions.54 Under this direction, the soldiers began gathering weapons and attacked the prison
where their leaders were being held, effectively freeing them. In the chaos, they killed Horimoto
Reizō, a Japanese training officer who had been invited to Korea by Queen Min to aid military
modernization efforts. After the Japanese legation that had been established in Seoul was
attacked by the soldiers, Japanese Minister Hanabusa Yoshitada escaped back to Japan. The
soldiers invaded the palace quarters the following day and killed Min Kyŏm-ho. Because of the
intensity of this perilous situation, King Kojong brought the Taewŏn’gun back to the palace, and
he was restored to power.55 The Taewŏn’gun reinstated the old military structure, effectively
ending the pursuit of the enlightenment policy in Korea. However, as a result of the Military
Mutiny, both Japan and China began intervening in Korea’s affairs.
This situation exacerbated Korea’s precarious global position. Minister Hanabusa
returned to Korea with army and navy forces and instructions from Tokyo to initiate negotiations
with the Korean government. Deeply disturbed by this show of military force, Qing China agreed
with Korean envoy Kim Yun-sik, who was in Tientsin at that time, to send troops to Korea to
confront the Japanese. A superior force of 4,500 men was dispatched to Korea under the
command of Wu Ch’ang-ch’ing. Under the justification that it was Korea’s suzerain power,
China argued that it must help its client state during such internal disorder.56 The Qing dynasty
also recommended that the Joseon government conclude a treaty with the United States later in
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1882, in order to preserve Korea’s tributary relationship with China.57 This was an opportunity
for China to restore its position of dominance in Korea which had been seized by Japan. General
Wu began stationing Chinese soldiers throughout Seoul. Wu then captured the Taewŏn’gun, and
sent him to Tientsin where he was placed under protective custody.
With the Taewŏn’gun out of power, the Japanese took advantage of the situation. Treaty
negotiations immediately resumed and the Treaty of Chemulpo was finalized. The terms of the
treaty specifically punished the leaders of the mutiny and indemnified “the families of the
Japanese victims.”58 It also required a payment of 500,000 yen in reparations to the Japanese
government, and “Japan was permitted to station a company of guards at the Japanese legation in
Seoul.”59 While this treaty would seem to increase Japan's influence in Korea, Qing China had
ultimately benefited from the Military Mutiny. China had greatly expanded its authority in Korea
and reasserted its rights as the suzerain power because of its dispatch of troops.60 Korea had also
sought out China’s help and high families in the Korean court became a pro-China faction that
actively pursued support from China. Because of these Korean perspectives, China was able to
appoint two foreign affair advisors in Korea, namely German P. G. von Mӧllendorff, an advisor
who had served in China for many years and Chinese diplomat Ma Chien-ch’ang.61 Furthermore,
in October of 1882, the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Joseon and Qing
was finalized, which effectively clarified the suzerain role of China and the vassal role of
Korea.62 Thus, the Military Mutiny resulted in the Korean government coming under the strong
influence of Qing China.
From this point, the relationship between the Joseon and Qing dynasties changed from a
tributary agreement to a more traditional suzerain-vassal relation. Simultaneously, being mindful
of Russia’s southward expansion, Japan followed a policy of cooperation towards the Qing
dynasty that avoided any mention of tributary relations issues even though Japan outwardly
rejected this relationship.63 However, Japan did raise the idea of a number of countries, including
Japan and the Qing dynasty, becoming responsible for the protection of Korea. In this
constructed notion, Japan would enjoy equal standing with Qing China. While the Joseon
government was more passive, the Qing dynasty refused this idea outright, so it was never
implemented in Korea.64
II.

The Tonghak Peasant Army Uprising (1894)
The other situation that demonstrates the intense competition between China and Japan
for influence in Korea and Korea’s opposition to Japanese influence is the Tonghak Peasant
Army Uprising. After a coup attempt by Korea’s Progressive Party in 1884 further complicated
Chinese and Japanese relations in regards to influence, Russian minister Karl Waeber was
stationed in Seoul. This was a stipulation of a treaty that had been concluded between Russia and
Korea that same year. Waeber was a savvy diplomat, and began to visit Korean court often,
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eventually “[fostering] a pro-Russian force” in the Joseon government.65 This inclination was
furthered by Advisor Mӧllendorff who believed Russia could balance the influence of China and
Japan in Korea. The efforts of Mӧllendorff and Waeber came to fruition in 1888, when an
Overland Trade Agreement opened Kyŏnghŭng, a Tumen River town near the border with
Russia, to Russian trade, granted Russia full navigation rights on the Tumen River, and allowed
Russians to live there in an extraterritorial settlement.66 Concerned with the influx of Russian
influence, China replaced Mӧllendorff with an American advisor (who also ended up advocating
for ties with Russia) and returned the Taewŏn’gun to Korea. England also dispatched a naval
force to the southern coast of Korea in 1885, which was prepared to counter any other Russian
movement.67 Essentially, Korea found itself in a grave international position, caught between the
conflicting ambitions of several countries.
In addition to Korea’s critical international situation, the country began to confront
domestic issues. After the Treaty of Kanghwa, a chronic financial crisis had ensued in part due to
the restitution payments to Japan, diplomatic missions, and the establishment of modern
facilities.68 Regardless, most of the financial burden had fallen on the peasantry, who were ruled
by the yangban class. Japan’s economic position in Korea had declined after Japanese
involvement in the failed coup of 1884. Despite their involvement, Japanese economic activity
achieved extraordinary proportions that “no other nation could rival” during the 1890s.69 In 1893,
around 1300 merchant ships arrived in Korea, and Japanese merchants made up 210 of the 258
businesses at the open ports.70 Overall, Japan was responsible for over 50% of imports into
Korea and received more than 90% of exports out of Korea. While China was responsible for
around 49% of other imports, neither Russia nor China came close to Japan’s economic
aggression and involvement in Korea’s foreign trade during the 1890s.
To combat the increase of Japan’s economic influence, the Joseon government began
prohibiting the exportation of rice from specific provinces. As rural Korean villages sank further
into poverty, the peasantry began retaining a growing hostility towards their yangban rulers and
foreign exploiters. These issues culminated in the Tonghak Peasant Uprising, which was a
widespread revolutionary movement of the peasantry against the oppressive economic system of
the Joseon dynasty.71 The Tonghak (later renamed the Ch’ŏndogyo) was a new religious group
that had been suppressed since its founding in 1864. However, this group had grown into a force
that utilized this deep hostility the peasantry held towards the Japanese and the yangban rulers.
In 1892, several thousand Tonghak believers gathered and demanded that the governors of the
Chŏlla and Ch’ungch’ŏng provinces end the persecution of Tonghak believers and clear the
name of their leader who had been executed for allegedly being Christian. When the governors
could only pledge to end the suppression, the Tonghak traveled to Seoul in an attempt to directly
petition the throne. The following year, they again went to Seoul where they were met by
government authorities who forcefully dispersed the crowd. Because of the dispersion, over
20,000 assembled at Poŭn in Ch’ungch’ŏng province, where they “proceeded to erect defensive
barricades, hoist banners, and call for a ‘crusade to expel the Japanese and Westerners.’”72 While
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this effort was dispersed by authorities, their show of growing numbers and strength
demonstrated how their movement had become more appealing to the Korean public.
In March of 1894, the Tonghak movement “erupted into a revolutionary peasant struggle
employing military operations on a large scale.”73 Specifically, in Kobu county, peasants
occupied the county office, under the leadership of Kobu county’s Tonghak parish leader Chŏn
Pong-jun. The magistrate of the county was known to be cruel, and had taken funds from the
peasantry to build a reservoir. The magistrate had also taken advantage of the peasants during the
building by exploiting their labor. In response, the peasants seized weapons, dispersed the
illegally collected tax rice to the destitute and then destroyed the reservoir.74 In the aftermath of
the incident, an inspector found the Tonghak members responsible for the uprising.
Consequently, the inspector arrested some members, executed others, and even further, burned
down other members’ homes. Because of the severe reaction, peasants began rallying around
Tonghak leaders to rise again. A proclamation was released which appealed to all peasants in
Korea. This proclamation mobilized peasants from the areas surrounding Kobu, and several
thousands joined forces with the Tonghak army. Many only had bamboo spears or batons as
weapons, but with over 10,000 men in their ranks they quickly crushed the government troops
sent to stop them, and effectively occupied Kobu. The Tonghak army then quickly pushed north,
soundly defeating an 800 man battalion sent from Seoul on their way to occupy Chŏnju.75
Panicked, the Joseon government sought out help from Qing China. The Chinese
immediately sent a sizable force to suppress the Tonghak. Due to the Convention of Tientsin
(1885) between China and Japan, this action was “reposted to the Japanese government.”76 In
response, Japan also sent troops, creating an increasingly tense confrontation between the two
nations on Korean soil. In the eyes of the Japanese and Chinese, this was an opportunity to
increase influence in Korea. Specifically, Japan sought to “restore its position of political
primacy but also was keenly aware of the need to ensure a Korean market for its products.”77
With the situation quickly becoming more dangerous, the Korean government proposed to
negotiate a truce with the Tonghak. The demands from the Tonghak were similar to those when
the uprising initially began: first, that the government would prevent the yangban from illegally
exploiting peasants; and secondly, that the government would stop the incursion of foreign
merchants. With this, the Tonghak peasant soldiers returned to their homes.
This truce was short-lived. Japan, under the justification that its citizen residents in Korea
must be protected, sent 7,000 troops and several warships to Inch’ŏn. By this time, the Tonghak
army had already withdrawn from the area, so there was no real reason for sending such a large
force to Korea. China recognized this discrepancy, and proposed a joint withdrawal to Japan
which was approved by both the Korean government and foreign powers.78 Japan promptly
rejected this plan, and proposed that the two powers collectively reform internal administration
in Korea. Because Japan and Korea had similar isolated backgrounds, the Meiji Restoration had
provided almost a blueprint of reforms that the Japanese could implement in Korea. Japan argued
that this reform was “absolutely essential if internal unrest were not again to flare into oben
rebellion, and that peace in East Asia depended on preventing such an occurrence.” 79 By arguing
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this, Japan raised the unacceptable issue of interfering in Korea’s internal affairs to China, and
unsurprisingly, China rejected the proposal. Talks between the two countries became deadlocked,
and the First Sino-Japanese War had begun.
Japan’s proposal to internally reform Korea with the Qing government also clearly
established Japan’s intent to colonize Korea. Besides the vast economic benefits Japan
understood Korea offered, there were various strategic concerns the Japanese government had
about Korea. Japan held the perception that Korea was an underdeveloped nation that could not
defend itself against Western powers. Because of Korea’s close location, the country posed a
threat to Japan’s national security. A general sense of insecurity about the advance of Western
power in Asia is evidenced to have been the “dominant concern in the acquisition of the
component territories of the Japanese empire.”80 Idealism, pride and prestige also prompted
Japan’s drive to establish an empire. The Meiji liberal movement’s political and social reformism
had instilled in some Meiji activists’ minds dreams of transforming “‘corrupted’ and ‘decaying’
Asian civilizations through reform” .81 An officially sponsored “sense of national destiny” to
inspire reform and to guide East Asia “along the path of modernity pioneered by Japan” did not
arise until the third decade of the Meiji empire. However, individual propagandists for imperial
expansion spoke of a Japanese “mission” in Asia to bring about development and progress,
comparable to how Greece and Rome had brought Western civilization to the Mediterranean.82
Additionally, Japan’s push for authority was based on an assumption of superiority. All
colonial systems held the perspective that colonial rulers were superior over their subjects
because empires were inflicted “by conquest or force by a stronger, more materially advanced
race” upon a weaker, more materially deficient people.83 However, this assumption for Japan was
also based on uniquely Japanese beliefs in “the mythic origins of the Japanese race, the divine
creation and inherent virtue of the Japanese Imperial House, and the mystical link between the
emperor and his people.”84 The centuries of isolation that Japan experienced had prevented these
beliefs from becoming a theory of racial superiority. However, when Japan began having success
in their imperial efforts, such as the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895, this racial assertiveness
transformed into an ideological belief held by most Japanese. This belief of superiority further
empowered the Japanese to intensely pursue influence in Korea.
The Tonghak Peasant Army Uprising was then defined by the determination of the
Korean people to end the oppressive rule of the yangban families, as well as resist the economic
aggression of the Japanese. Both Japan and China capitalized on this situation to increase their
influence in Korea, eventually leading to the First Sino-Japanese War. Japan’s economic
aggression and proposal to internally reform Korea signified Japan’s intent to colonize the
country, under the belief that Korea did not possess the necessary strength to resist Western
powers and that Japan, a superior race, could help reform Korea. The financial burden that had
been inflicted on Korean peasants as a result of Japanese economic aggression and the yangban
rulers instilled a deep hostility that the Tonghak were able to utilize in their movement. The
Korean people continued to resist Japanese influence until the March First Movement.
Originally, the Tonghak’s demands to expel the Japanese were made upon the Joseon
government, but after the truce failed the Tonghak organized a second uprising in which they
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fought face-to-face with the Japanese. However, with such a lack of resources, the Tonghak
could not challenge the modern weaponry and training used by the Japanese troops. Therefore,
caught struggling against both the yangban and foreign imperialism, the Tonghak’s efforts were
officially ended by Japanese troops in December of 1894.
Japanese Motivations Behind, and Benefits From the First Sino-Japanese War (1894)
This paper will not discuss the specifics of the First Sino-Japanese War, as there are
plenty of materials that have recorded and interpreted the historical event. However, this work
will engage with the motivations behind Japan’s involvement in the War. On July 16, 1894, only
fourteen days before declaring war on China, Japan concluded a new treaty with England which
determined that England would “give up its consular jurisdiction in Japan in five years.”85 Other
countries followed suit during the next year, leaving Japan with multiple new and fairly equal
treaties. These treaties were significant because it was the first time Western powers formally
acknowledged Japan as a civilized society in international law.
While there was no defined standard of civilization, a discourse about civilization
certainly existed internationally. Found in the writings of Henry Wheaton, Theodore D, Woolsey,
Robert Phillimore, and other international lawyers, international law was described as “limited to
civilized states.”86 Any non-Western states “had to achieve the same degree of civilization as the
West in order to obtain full subject status in international law.”87 This Western language and
discourse about civilization had reached Japan by at least the late 1860s, after the Tokugawa
government sent Nishi Amane (and fourteen other students) to Holland to learn about Western
politics and military technologies. While at Leiden University, Nishi had encountered
international law courses. After returning to Japan, he compiled his notes on international law
into a book which was published in 1868 by Japan’s Bureau of Translation and Foreign Affairs.
Thus, the Japanese had become aware of the importance of understanding international terms and
law.
More Japanese scholars began engaging with international legal terms. A turning point
was reached in 1869 when Shigeno Yatsusugu was ordered by a Satsuma ruler to translate the
Chinese rendering of Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law. Within his translation,
Shigeno “offered working definitions in Japanese of the fundamental terms of international
law.”88 By making the terms workable in Japanese, the concept of a “civilized state” became
comprehensible to educated Japanese citizens and leaders, who could then advise government
officials. In 1875, Fukuzawa Yukichi released his Outline of the Theory of Civilization in which
he “repeatedly urged Japanese leaders to label the country ‘independent’ in order to participate as
a civilized state in the enlightened world.”89 The Japanese had realized how defining their
country as civilized could benefit their country. The practical application of international legal
terms “enabled Japan to conclude new trade treaties with England and Germany… and they
confidently displayed the transformation abroad.”90
Thus, Japan’s engagement with international legal terms allowed the country to improve
its international position before the First Sino-Japanese War, and even during the war. However,
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if Japan lost the war or failed to respect international law during the fighting, the treaties could
have been nullified and Japan would still have been considered outside of the community of
international law.91 Consequently, Japan’s involvement in the war can be attributed in part to the
need to prove its strength and civility, so the new treaties would be upheld and Japan would
finally be an official member of the international community.
Additionally, as mentioned above, the Japanese were also motivated by pride and
prestige. Just as “steel navies, constitutions, machine guns, rationalized tax structures, and steam
locomotives” demonstrated modernization in the late nineteenth century, obtaining a colonial
empire “was a mark of national eminence, the ultimate status symbol upon the world scene.”92
Consequently, after a decisive Japanese victory early in 1895, Prime Minister of Japan Itō
Hirobumi demanded that the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki include “cession of the Liaotung
peninsula and the island of Taiwan, as well as payment of a huge indemnity.”93 Japan’s
acknowledgement of Korea’s full independence was written in the first article of the treaty, not to
guarantee that Korea would remain independent, but rather to repudiate China’s suzerainty claim
over Korea. The annexation of Korea was not even considered by the Japanese as an option in
this treaty because that would have risked active opposition by Western powers. The Qing
government bowed to Japanese pressure, but the Triple Intervention of Russia, Germany, and
France forced the retrocession of Liaotung. As a result of that intervention, Japanese members of
the House of Representatives compiled Interventions, Arbitrations, Envoys during War and
Capitulations. Essentially, the Japanese compiled almost every aspect of the First Sino-Japanese
War and “made the war a showcase of their knowledge of international law”94 However, with the
acquisition of Taiwan, Japan possessed its first colonial territory, marking its first step on the way
to empire and a place among the nations of the world.95
Effects of the Russo-Japanese War (1905)
During the decade in between the First Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War,
Japan began tightening its grip on Korea. The large Japanese force that had arrived in Korea
during the Tonghak Uprising occupied Kyŏngbok Palace and restored the Taewŏngun to power.
Afterwards, Japanese “advisors” began forcing modernizing reforms, known as the Gabo
Reform, on the weak Korean government.96 Simultaneously, Japan had intensified its economic
stake in Korea by constructing railways and rapidly increasing its commercial activity
throughout the country.97 On the other hand, Russia had been expanding its influence into
Northeast Asia. After the forced retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula to China in 1895, Russia
had concluded a secret military agreement with the Qing and had acquired the rights to build part
of the Trans-Siberian Railway down through Manchuria.98 Russia also acquired twenty-five year
leases on two ports in Manchuria, Port Arthur and Dalian. With a solidified control over
Manchuria, Russia turned its attention and efforts towards Korea.
Because of Russia’s efforts and the presence of more than 100,000 Russian troops in
Manchuria due to the Boxer Rebellion, Japan signed into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with
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England in 1902. This agreement was focused on containing the Russian threat, and both sides
recognized each other’s interests. England’s rights and interests in China were recognized by
Japan, and England acknowledged Japan’s special interests in Korea. This alliance greatly
fortified Japan’s international position, and in unanimity with England and the United States,
Japan demanded that Russia withdraw its troops from Manchuria. Russia pledged to effect
withdrawal in three stages, but ultimately failed to do so, even having its troops cross the Yalu
River into Korea. In 1904, on the brink of war with Russia, Japan sent troops to Seoul and
occupied buildings throughout the city. Under threat, Korea signed a protocol agreement with
Japan which in essence provided a “legal justification for whatever political and military actions
Japan might wish to take in Korea.”99 Even further, in exchange for abandoning its original
demand (in the protocol agreement) to open all uncultivated Korean lands to development by
Japanese colonists, Japan created another agreement which allowed for a Japanese “‘government
of advisors’ in Korea.” 100 These actions taken by the Japanese government were highly strategic,
and eventually led to Korea becoming a protectorate of Japan.
That same year, the ministers of the Japanese emperor offered a compromise with Russia,
a recognition of Russian primacy in Manchuria and in exchange Japan would have a free hand in
Korea.”101 While the two countries did enter into negotiations, no ground for compromise could
be found, and in February of 1904, Japan subsequently “carried out a surprise attack on the
Russian installations at Port Arthur.” 102 Contrary to international expectations, the
Russo-Japanese War was defined by a series of Japanese victories from the beginning to the
end.103 The bloody war that ensued was a measure of how Japan had risen as a military and
imperial power. At a high cost to Japan, Japanese armies conquered the Liaotung peninsula and
the ports of Dalian and Port Arthur, officially driving Russia from South Manchuria. Japanese
troops then stormed Sakhalin to use as a bargaining chip in treaty negotiations. With Russia
ready to discuss peace, President Theodore Roosevelt offered to mediate the negotiations
between the two countries. In the end, the Portsmouth Treaty gave Japan its next imperial
acquisitions: a long-term lease on the Liaotung peninsula; the southern half of Sakhalin; and all
Russian rights and privileges in South Manchuria.104
Not only did Japan gain substantial territory, but it had succeeded in removing the last
major threat of influence in Korea. By the terms of the treaty, Russia pledged to not “hinder
Japan from taking whatever actions it deemed necessary for the ‘guidance, protection, and
control’ of the Korean government” and acknowledged Japan’s political, military, and economic
interests in Korea.105 England and the U.S. also recognized Japan’s interests in Korea.
Thus, Japan could now make Korea its colony and did so in two stages. The first stage
established Korea as a Japanese protectorate from 1905-1910, during which civilian Resident
General Itō Hirobumi tried establishing a succession of well-intentioned reforms while
simultaneously liquidating Korean political institutions and replacing them with Japanese
ones.106 After the conclusion of the treaty, Japan immediately moved to make Korea its
protectorate. Itō Hirobumi, with an escort of Japanese troops, was sent to Korea to conclude the
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protectorate treaty. After Korean officials and the King Kojong refused the demands by Ito to
accept the treaty, Japanese gendarmes dragged the most vocal opponent, Han Kyu-sŏl, out of the
room. The treaty was then brought to the Foreign Ministry and signed by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, which validated the treaty despite the illegal nature of the whole interaction. The second
stage of colonization took place in 1910, in which Korea was formally annexed as a colony
(Chŏsen) and put under the merciless rule of General Terauchi Masatake, its first
Governor-General.
The Russo-Japanese War then signified the breakthrough of Japan as an international
power. Korea became its official protectorate, creating a straightforward path for Japan to later
colonize the country. However, Japan’s new international standing had been “achieved at
staggering costs with frightful burdens for the taxpayers, and more lay ahead” in contrast to
Russia’s rapid recovery post-war.107 Tokutomi Sohō, a prominent Japanese historian, journalist,
and close friend of Meiji Prime Ministers Yamagata Aritomo and Katsura Tarō, argued these
sacrifices were necessary to achieve national greatness. Sohō had defined that for Japan, two
courses of action were open, either self-reliance or dependency. Self-reliance entailed
imperialism, while dependency would have meant Japan had to “accept the fate of
annexation.”108 Sohō’s arguments provide insight into the motivations behind Japan’s aggressive
imperialism. The clear and categorical delineations between self-reliance and dependency meant
the Japanese perceived imperialism as Sohō described: “a policy born out of necessity if [Japan
was] to exist as a nation and survive as a race.”109
The Hague Mission (1907)
In 1906, a royal letter from King Kojong was published in the newspaper, Taehan Maeil
Sinbo (Korean Daily News). In the letter, he expressed that he had not consented to the
protectorate treaty and appealed for a joint protection of the powers.110 In hopes of appealing to
the international community, King Kojong sent three representatives, Yi Sang-sŏl, Yi Chun, and
Yi Wi-jong, on his behalf to the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague in
1907. They arrived during the second week of the conference with a letter from King Kojong
that detailed “the invalidity of the protectorate and [demanded] international condemnation of
Japan.”111 However, even as the three young representatives called upon diplomats from
countries that had “long-standing relations with Korea, none except the Russian envoy gave them
more than a passing notice.”112 The young men protested that the protectorate treaty was invalid
without the seal of the king, but their request to be seated was ultimately denied.
This dismissal resulted from two concepts, Korea being an official protectorate of Japan,
and the Conference’s own agenda. Because Korea was now a protectorate of Japan, which gave
international legal precedent to Japan’s control over Korea’s foreign affairs, international law
prevented Koreans from legally attending the forum. Therefore, Koreans could not conduct their
own foreign relations, and the president of the Conference ruled that Korea could not be
permitted to participate.113 Secondly, the three mens’ appeal was discarded by delegates from
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forty-three countries that were there to discuss world peace. The representatives’ attempt to
appeal and protest interfered with the world order that the delegates wanted to legitimate.114 If the
Conference had recognized their assertion of invalidity, this would have destroyed the worldview
which determined Korea’s dependence on Japan. It would have also rejected the Conference’s
claim to define the meaning of international peace, which allowed certain countries to legally
colonize and control other states. Accordingly, Korea’s first non-violent effort to appeal to the
international community was dismissed.
Japan used the fallout from this effort to further intervene in Korea. The lack of
acknowledgement of Korea by the international community enabled Japanese officials to
broaden their control. The Japanese had King Kojong relinquish his throne to his son, Sunjong,
who became emperor in July 1907. After announcing King Kojong’s abdication, massive protest
demonstrations arose in Seoul which were quickly met with Japanese military force and ended.
Immediately after, on July 24, 1907, Japan and Korea signed the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1907
which gave the Japanese Resident-General formal authority to intervene in any and all matters of
internal administration. This treaty also made the appointment of Japanese in official positions
mandatory, and transferred “all judicial powers in Korea to Japan’s command”115 While very few
countries noticed when Korea became a protectorate of Japan, in 1907 there was a much larger
audience who watched and applauded Japan’s effort to dissolve Korea’s internal state.
Japan also dissolved what was left of the Korean army, which had already been greatly
reduced. This action was described as a “temporary measure” until a new conscription system
could be established. The day the army was disbanded, the troops of the Second Infantry Guards
regiment “engaged the Japanese army of occupation in battle in the streets of Seoul.”116 Forms of
domestic resistance had been demonstrated earlier, with the Tonghak Peasant Uprising, but were
already beginning to surface again against the Japanese. Without any structured means for
self-defense, however, Korea was only a few short years away from becoming a Japanese colony.
The Annexation Treaty
In 1907, the Japanese colonial regime began “publishing English-language reports
detailing its Korean policies.”117 Itō, or “His Imperial Japanese Majesty’s Residency General,”
was the first to publish a report, titled Annual Report for 1907 on Reforms and Progress in
Korea.118 This project lasted until the collapse of the Japanese empire in 1945, and each report
offers a detailed account of the policies enacted in Korea during a year period. The 1907 Report,
which was distributed in early 1908, describes the lengths that Japan took to help Korea achieve
its own international recognition: “With the hope of making Korea’s independence a reality,
Japan employed all the resources of friendly suggestion to induce the former to adopt modern
civilized methods… In consequence, however, of jealousy between political parties, nothing
resulted but plots and counterplots.”119 The Report also clarified that Koreans were not capable
of ruling themselves and consequently could not “participate as subjects in international
terms.”120 It states,
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[After 1905] Japan had now realized that Korea was not capable of governing herself,
and that the policy of maintaining her independence could not be pursued without making
certain modifications… Thus Japan took the responsibility of intervention in Korean
affairs, after having given the Koreans ample opportunity to prove their fitness for
self-government, and after having found them wholly unprepared for the task.121
From 1907 to 1910, the Japanese government also made a showcase of its growing control over
Korea. The Meiji government took the Korean crown prince, Yi Yun, from the palace and
displayed the young man throughout tours of Japan to “educate him in an enlightened
manner.”122 For the Japanese government this was significant because it was able to show
Japanese leaders, reporters, and citizens that Japan had progressed enough internationally that
they now had foreign royalty coming to their country for enlightenment.
On July 13, 1910, about a month before the annexation of Korea, U.S. Ambassador
O’Brien at the American Embassy in Tokyo, wrote a correspondence to the Acting Secretary of
State Philander C. Knox. The letter described the Japanese Imperial Government’s intention to
abolish the Korean policing system and create a single department run by the Japanese
gendarmerie. Ambassador O’Brien wrote, “Under the new arrangement–the regulations relating
to which are inclosed herewith–these heterogeneous organizations are abolished and a single
police department subject to the residency general is organized, with the Japanese gendarmerie
as a nucleus… the larger part of the force will consist of Japanese gendarmerie”123 The letter
came with an enclosed English translation of a memorandum exchanged between Resident
General Terauchi and Korean Acting Prime Minister Pak Che Soon, which declared that Korea’s
government would entrust its police affair to Japan. The civil police, consisting of Koreans and
Japanese, were merged with the Japanese military police. Additionally, an inspectorate general in
charge of police affairs would be positioned at Seoul and would be subject to the control of the
Resident General.
This letter demonstrates a specific, but powerful change made by the Japanese even
before official annexation. By this time, Koreans had already begun establishing a pattern of
resistance against Japan with the Tonghak Peasant Uprising, the Hague Mission, and the
confrontation in Seoul after the Korean army’s dissolution. At the same time, the Japanese had
created their own pattern of responding to any resistance with force. This change was then an
extension of that Japanese pattern, a measure taken by the Japanese government to prepare for
unrest they anticipated from Koreans in response to the annexation. The unification of the police
system under the Resident-General also put the Japanese in an ideal position for the easy
enforcement of colonial policies after annexation. This memorandum was significant, because it
put Japanese police in complete control of Korean citizens.
This memorandum signified a final preventative measure the Japanese took before
annexation. On August 10, 1910 the treaty annexing Korea to Japan was concluded, signed by
Prime Minister of Korea, Ye Wan Yeng, and future first Japanese Governor-General of Korea,
Terauchi Masatake. The preamble declared that Japan’s annexation of Korea was intended to
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“promote the common weal of the two nations and assure permanent peace” in Asia. 124 In
thirteen articles, the treaty finalized Japanese control of Korea, now to be called Chŏsen.
The First Decade of the Japanese Colonization of Korea
I. The Annexation
On September 17, 1910, Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson sent a
correspondence to the Japanese Ambassador. The letter detailed the U.S. government’s
acknowledgement of the 1910 annexation of Korea after receiving a notice from Japan on
August 24th. Assistant Secretary Wilson states, “While I am constrained by the great importance
of the interests of American citizens in Korea to make all necessary reservations as to their rights
and privileges, I beg to inform your excellency that the Government of the United States is
gratified to note the assurances already given by the Imperial Japanese Government concerning
matters relating to foreigners and foreign trade in Korea.”125 While the U.S. government did
recognize the annexation, there were concerns about the changes the Japanese would make
regarding not only trade with Korea, but extraterritoriality and other privileges foreign citizens
had possessed when Korea was independent. Regardless, Assistant Secretary Wilson did describe
that the U.S. government, and surely other countries who had agreements with Korea, had
received reassurances from the Japanese government during this period of change. This
correspondence demonstrates not only Japan’s preparedness for the annexation, as they sent out a
notice only two weeks after the treaty signing, but also their eagerness to start off relations
amicably with Korea’s foreign partners.
Terauchi Masatake, now the new Governor-General of Korea (replacing the
Resident-General position), compiled and released an Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in
Chosen (Korea) for the time period of 1910-1911 that totalled over 260 pages and described the
vast structural changes made during the official colonization of Korea. The introduction of this
specific Report provides some insight into the Japanese perspectives of the annexation process.
For example, it states, “...under the new regime steady progress is expected in every branch of
administration, central and local, with a view to improving the conditions of the Peninsula and
meeting the actual needs of the people.”126 In declaring the intent of “meeting the actual needs of
the people,” the Japanese were insinuating Korean inferiority and establishing their colonization
as beneficial. The Report continues, describing that the “vital object of annexation” was mainly
to “secure stability of peace and tranquility for the Peninsula.”127 This simple explanation ignored
the almost thirty-five years of colonial politics that Korea had endured because of Japan, and
reduced that history to a single, justifiable explanation behind the annexation. Again, Japan
capitalized on the recent tumultuous situations Korea had experienced by writing this statement,
situations that had been largely prompted because of foreign interference.
The Korean reaction to the annexation is briefly addressed. The Report explains,
“Contrary to the expectation that carrying out the annexation would create suspicion on the part
of certain classes of the people and cause a disturbance of the general peace and order, it was
quietly and calmly carried into effect, the police measures already taken having proved sufficient
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for every emergency.”128 Surely biased and generalized, the Japanese described the
implementation of the annexation as easy, and in doing so, insinuated that Korea was then a
docile country because of the colonization practices Japan enforced. Additionally, the Report
discussed that imperial donations, exempted land taxes, and criminal pardoning had taken place
during the annexation, resulting in the “people of Korea [putting] away their suspicions and
anxieties” and becoming “appreciative” of the “new regime.”129 Not only did Koreans become
less resistant to the change, according to the Japanese Governor-General, but they even
“gradually became trustful toward the officials appointed by the Imperial Government.”130 The
tone of this section is reassuring, as the Japanese wanted to encourage the belief that Koreans
were accepting and easily adapting to the changes they were facing. This biased report of Korean
perceptions was meant not only to justify every calculated action taken by the Japanese
government’s actions, but also to create the perception that Japan was greatly benefiting its new
colony. Even the unification of the police system Japan had enforced prior to annexation was
addressed, characterized as a successful maneuver that had allowed annexation to be
implemented smoothly.
This Report did as it was intended, informing imperial countries worldwide of its
successes. In 1914, the Journal of the Royal Society of Arts reviewed the 1910-1911 report,
describing that in the short year of colonization “a great deal [had] been accomplished” and that
the “ill-feeling which the natives at first felt towards their conquerors” was already “becoming a
thing of the past.”131 The rest of the world perceived the Japanese as successful in their efforts
and believed that “faith in the impartiality of Japanese justice” was bringing the two nations and
peoples together.132 In short, international countries were taking the Japanese at their word.
In reality, however, the Japanese were facing “[scattered] guerrilla resistance against
[their] presence from 1907 to 1911.”133 The Report described those who attempted to resist the
changes as “insurgents” and provided statistics on the suppression of the “insurgent” efforts.
According to the Japanese, 1593 “insurgents” were captured, 240 were killed, and 115 were
wounded. In comparison, only seven Japanese gendarmes were killed and twenty were
wounded.134 Other accounts describe the fighters as guerrilla soldiers, comprising the Righteous
Armies for Korean Independence, and peaking at 69,832 members who had 1451 clashes with
the Japanese in 1908.135 The resistance from Koreans resulted in an increase in Japanese military
police and civil police presence which crushed the insurgent effort, remaining in Korea during
the first decade of colonization. In 1911, there was relative peace but the military police
continued to be in complete control of the Korean people. According to Governor-General
Terauchi, it was “easier to use the gendarmes than police to control a primitive people.”136 This
sentiment reflected the Japanese perception of empire, which was not motivated by wanting to
improve native Koreans’ lives. Instead, this viewpoint held that Japan and its colonies were
distinct and separate entities that had correspondingly distinct and separate futures. This theory
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of colonial rule was certainly shaped by the effort to prove that Japan was civilized, based on
apparent racial and cultural differences between the Japanese and their colonial subjects.137
II.

Japanese Colonial Practices
After annexation, the thirty-five year period of Japanese colonial rule that profoundly
affected the development of modern Korea began. The rule was harsh, discriminatory,
destructive, and structured in a systemic way that was inescapable for Koreans. Huge
bureaucracies, oversized by colonial standards, were built in Korea in highly centralized
locations.138 After suppressing initial insurgencies, Japanese colonial administrators “with
unlimited zeal, naturally applied the hierarchical standards of their own society to the
Koreans.”139 These standards treated Koreans as a secondary people.
Japanese rule was exercised through the Governor-General who possessed all legislative,
executive and judicial powers and was appointed from the ranks of Japanese generals or admirals
on active duty.140 Governor-General Terauchi was known for his outright discrimination and
employed the gendarmerie police system that had been used for the annexation. After the
Japanese enacting laws that legalized racial discrimination against the Koreans, Koreans faced
the Japanese monopolization of all management and supervisory positions in the government,
factories, and the police force. Essentially, Koreans were limited to clerical positions and could
not advance their position. Korean workers would labor for longer hours and get paid half the
wages a Japanese worker would earn.141
Landholding was also hugely “reformed” due to the fact that the Japanese seized large
agricultural plots for themselves. A cadastral survey was conducted and required Korean citizens
to report their landholdings to the new Land Survey Bureau. Those who failed to report and
register their land in the short period of time provided had it confiscated by the
Governor-General.142 Subsequently, Governor-Generals sold the land at much less than it was
worth to Japanese companies who produced huge profits off the land. The cadastral survey and
land survey law then enabled Japanese companies and Governor-Generals to become great and
powerful landowners who provided profits for Japan, while Korean citizens were forced off their
land.143
Industrial and agricultural production in Korea was designated to only serve Japan’s
needs. Japanese companies exploited the natural resources of Korea with the generous backing of
the Governor-General. In 1910, Governor-General Terauchi enacted a company ordinance which
stipulated that his approval was needed to establish a company.144 He operated all transportation
facilities such as railways, harbors, and airports, and created monopolies on products like opium,
salt, tobacco, and ginseng.145 Operating under such favorable conditions, Japanese companies
were able to monopolize Korea’s natural resources, industries, and finances for their benefit.
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Combined with currency reform that replaced Korean currency with Japanese coins, Korean
businesses struggled to obtain enough capital to survive. This was reflected in 1917 factory
statistics of Korea, which show that in total there were 605 Korean factories that had about 1.8
million yen in capital and 8.2 million yen of production that year. In contrast, there were 736
Japanese factories in 1917 that had around 33 million yen in capital and 84 million yen of
production. The discrepancies between Korean and Japanese factories are apparent, as Korean
businesses were forced to compete against the firm control Japan had established during the first
decade of colonization.
As mentioned before, the Japanese had increased their military police presence due to
resistance, so during the first decade of colonial rule there was a prominent military policy. The
colony was divided into thirteen provinces which were locally administered, and each province
was subdivided into cities and counties (made up of townships). The dispersal goal for police in
Korea was one substation in every township.146 Essentially, the Japanese had formed a police
state, in which officers exercised vast powers, even in civil administration and judicial affairs.
Anyone who did not cooperate with the rule of the Governor-General became subject to arrest.
The military presence and influence was intense, resulting in even school teachers carrying
swords and wearing uniforms in Korean classes.147 Floggings and fines were administered often,
with no judicial recourse, and newspapers that published any nationalist thought or idea were
closed down to prevent an unfavorable public opinion from forming. Education was also
drastically changed during the first decade of colonization, which will be further discussed in the
missionary section of this paper. The political suppression of Koreans was exhaustive and
widespread, creating a society where free speech, free press, suffrage, and representative
government were completely nonexistent.
The Japanese colonization of Korea was meant to rule and exploit the colony for
Japanese interests, and the Governor-General was the spearhead of this rule. Enjoying nearly
complete freedom in colonial administration, Governor-General Terauchi created a highly
authoritarian, centralized government structure that was enforced by an abundant military police
presence that abused its authority. Koreans competed for enough resources and money to
maintain their businesses and survive under colonial rule. All citizens, especially laborers, felt
the weight of the discriminatory policies that designated Koreans as second-class citizens. These
brutal policies reinforced a national consciousness amongst all classes against Japanese rule,
ultimately contributing to the development of the March First Movement.
This consciousness grew both domestically and abroad. The suppression of the
1907-1911 resistance efforts had caused many Korean nationalists to flee overseas. After settling
in southeastern Manchuria and the Russian Maritime Territory, nationalists began establishing
military bases within independence operations. For example, the Training School of the New
Rising was established in Manchuria in 1911 and the Korean Restoration Army was established
in the Russian Maritime Province in 1914.148 Another independence base was established in
Shanghai by 1919, creating the New Korea Youth Corps. While the Righteous Army for Korean
Independence had been apprehended during its suppression, two other organizations, the Society
for the Restoration of Independence and the Corps for the Restoration of Korean National
Sovereignty, had formed in Korea in 1913 and 1915 respectively. Both organizations actively
participated in the March First Movement. Other domestic groups, such as the Korean National
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Society, were organized by students and Christian youth who raised funds for the independence
movement. Smaller covert societies were also formed by teachers in Seoul and other cities, and
advocated for education promotion and economic strength for the Korean people.149 During the
first decade of colonization, these nationalist groups at home and abroad only strengthened the
national consciousness against the Japanese which culminated in the March First Movement of
1919.
The Presence of Protestant Missionaries in Korean Education
The presence of Protestant missionaries in Korea during the first decade of colonization
also helped strengthen Korea’s anti-Japanese national consciousness through education. Before
colonization, Korea had two different kinds of traditional Chinese schools. First were provincial
schools sponsored by the royal government in each county and were run by local county
administrators. Second were private schools located throughout the country that mainly served
yangban families and other upper-class Koreans who desired the classical Chinese education.150
The first Protestant missionary, Dr. Horace Allen, arrived in Korea in April of 1885. Dr. Allen
had been in Korea once before as a physician to foreigners living in Seoul, but now he worked to
gain appointment as an official physician to the U.S. legation. His family arrived in Korea a
month later, where together they established the first official Protestant outpost in Seoul.151
Korean mission work was officially established in 1892 by the Presbyterian Church in the USA
(PCUSA) with the appointments of three new clergymen. In 1895, the major missionary groups
in Korea were the PCUSA, the United Church of Canada, the Methodist Episcopal Church, the
Methodist Episcopal Church South, Presbyterian Church South, and the Australian Presbyterian.
It is important to understand that Western missionaries during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were believers in the supremacy of Western civilization. In this light,
they became effective and committed operatives of Westernization. Early on in their work,
American missionaries established a close relationship with the Korean royal family and became
mentors to multiple progressive intellectuals and politicians.152 These powerful connections, in
addition to treaty privileges, allowed missionaries to carry out “civilizing responsibilities” such
as teaching Korean youth Western learning, importing and selling Western tools, and publishing
newspapers.
A Protestant newspaper, the Christian News, demonstrates the efforts of missionaries to
help build a modern-nation state in Korea. The missionaries employed Korean translators to
translate the articles into hangul, the easy alphabet used by the uneducated. In its first issue in
1897, a special article described the intention of enabling Koreans to meet “the new enlightened
time” by educating them about the “better ways of working and living” in “rich and powerful
countries.”153 While the primary intention of the newspaper was still to “reveal the glory of
Christ,” the Christian News offered a Korean history series, gave price lists for local markets,
and even ran series like “On World Affairs” and “Overseas Correspondence.” 154 Until its
dissolution in 1910, this newspaper continued to idealize Westernization while attempting to
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enlighten Korean readers about the Western world. However, missionaries working on these
publications failed to take into account Korea’s history. which had instilled a gap between
“Korean’s love for their country and their love for their family” in their consciousness.155 At this
point, Koreans had never been given the right to participate in the running of their country,
resulting in a lack of understanding of a shared national identity. Thus, while this effort was
meaningful, the Korean people were not given enough time to engage and implement the idea of
building a new nation-state of their own. While most Koreans may have not been able to
understand a shared national identity, the Tonghak Peasant Uprising, Hague Mission, and the
confrontation in Seoul after the Korean army’s dissolution had shown that Koreans could come
together to resist the Japanese.
Even so, missionaries Westernized and impacted Korean society through education.
Although missionaries were originally coming to Korea with an evangelical purpose, they soon
realized that “in order to convert they had to teach.”156 The low literacy rate in Korea worked to
the advantage of the missionaries, as Christianity became associated with the dissemination of
reading. Missionaries quickly opened their mission education to every possible convert, as they
originally had only taught Christian Koreans, and began establishing schools. In the early 1900s,
Protestant missionaries in Korea established numerous elementary schools that offered basic
literacy in a Korean script, known as onmun. Missionaries even began founding secondary
schools and colleges, open to both young men and women. By 1905, the country-wide
movement for “education for the nation” had taken over Korea, resulting in the opening of night
schools, laborers’ schools, and short-term training centers in urban areas. Mission work covered
all of Korea, with the majority of missionaries coming from America, while Australian and
Canadian Presbyterians and British Anglicans also contributed to this work. 157 Many Koreans
who had once been politically active in movements became committed to educational pursuits
with independence in mind.158 The movement also led to the use of onmun in private schools’
curricula, where Western-style subjects were beginning to be taught.159 The teaching of these
subjects is another example of the Westernization efforts initiated by missionaries, but also gave
Koreans the opportunity to learn about subjects that had been excluded by the Japanese. The
1905 education movement then certainly increased the influence of missionaries in Korea,
resulting in a huge expansion of Westernized education and Christianity in Korea until the
annexation.
When Japanese advisors were sent to Seoul in 1904, they quickly became alarmed by the
“education for the nation” movement. Thus, Japanese educational policies were enforced right
away when Korea became a protectorate in 1905. Resident-General Itō immediately shut down
many of the Korean-run private schools, and took over the numerous schools that had begun
teaching Western-style subjects. He justified these actions by claiming that these schools had
been refuges for anti-Japanese sentiment. All private schools, including schools that had been
organized by missionaries or other religious groups, had to get approval from the
Resident-General for continued operation. This requirement lasted until the annexation and
greatly reduced Korean private schools. By the end of 1909, only 820 of the 1995 requests from
private schools had been granted.160 In contrast, missionary schools were generally left alone due
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to extraterritoriality privileges. Because Korean private schools were being shut down and Japan
was still in the process of building public or “ordinary” schools in Korea, enrollment in
missionary schools increased.
After the annexation, Governor-General Terauchi intensified the policies against
education in Korea. His position was made clear in his compiled Report for the year 1910-1911.
When discussing private schools, he states,
Instead of participating in sober educational work, some of these schools often
intermeddled in political agitation against the Japanese Protectorate and the new regime
undertaken by the Korean Government, and used text books of a seditious nature,
inimical to the peace and order of the country. After the enforcement of the Private
School Regulations, most of the private schools obtained Government recognition;
numbers of them, which had inadequate funds or equipments having been amalgamated
with better schools or done away altogether; and the using of text books of a seditious
nature was also stopped.161
A nationwide search for Korean geographical and historical work was conducted in 1910, in
which the Japanese seized and burned 200,000 to 300,000 works.162 This hunt destroyed
biographies of Korean national heroes, and translations of foreign works that described
independence movements around the world. The Education Act of 1911 further allowed the
Japanese to conduct these unjust changes in the Korean education system. It included designating
Japanese as the national language, meaning onmun was replaced in schools. According to the
1910-1911 Report, even terms were changed in textbooks that were “inconsistent after
Annexation.”163 The education system further entrapped Koreans under colonial rule, and was
used by Japan to keep their subjects “less civilized” than the Japanese.
In limiting the scope of Korean history and distorting the remaining historical works, the
Japanese government intended for the education system to be a colonial tool that would
gradually transform Koreans into loyal Japanese subjects. Japan focused on the slow and steady
expansion of basic elementary education and worked to discourage “unnecessary” higher
education in Korea.164 Because the Japanese prioritized Koreans’ becoming docile Japanese
subjects prepared for modern but humble work and life, basic education was the only form of
education the Japanese felt was necessary in Korea.
Japanese authorities also possessed doubts about the loyalty of missionary-run schools.
The Report states,
Certain missionaries, also, accustomed hitherto to defend their converts, were led into
complaining of measures undertaken by the local authorities even in the days of reform.
Although some missionaries were very careful not to intermeddle with matters which lay
beyond their proper sphere, native converts were so vehement in professing anti-Japanese
sentiments that they passed quite beyond the control of the former. But even under such
conditions, one ought to not jump to the conclusion that missionaries are responsible for
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the fact that a certain class of Christian converts are anti-Japanese or that certain others
joined the insurgents.165
The Japanese then were hesitant to blame missionaries for anti-Japanese sentiments after the
annexation, largely due to the fact that Western missionaries were still protected by their treaty
privileges. Japan’s cautious words demonstrate how wary it was of provoking any powerful
Western government, even if there were suspicions of some missionaries being “too close” to
their Korean converts. This hesitancy led to the blaming of Korean converts for any
anti-Japanese attitudes, but the Japanese government continued to keep a close eye on
missionaries. As described in The English Church Mission in Corea, missionaries were forced to
“live much in the public eye, [seen as] a fair specimen for observation when [they walk]
abroad.”166 And even with their special privileges, Governor-General Terauchi described that “he
would afford due protection and facilities for legitimate missionary undertakings, but would be
obliged to treat them according to law if they injured public peace.”167 The presence of
missionaries was an annoyance to the Japanese, as they were witnesses to the harsh Japanese rule
and often reported events from their own perspectives, rather than the perspective of the
Governor-General.168
As the years progressed during the first decade of colonization, missionaries were
continuously viewed by the Japanese as suspicious. The 1911-1912 Annual Report explains that
“the Government now trusts these foreign missionaries to confine their activities to purely
religious work without any intermeddling in political affairs.”169 Even so, Japan accused
missionaries of conspiring with nationalistic Koreans. There were reportedly 307 Christian
missionaries in Korea and a total number of 281,946 Christian converts according to the report.
Around 700 of the 1700 private schools were run by missionaries that year. After an
assassination attempt was executed against Governor-General Terauchi in 1910, in which 123
Koreans were arrested on a falsified charge (105 were Protestant converts), Japanese authorities
were accused by missionaries abroad of torturing the indicted and aiming to “[wipe] out the
Christian movement in Korea.”170 Referred to as the “Conspiracy Case” or the “105 Incident,”
Governor-General Terauchi capitalized on Resident-General Itō’s killing a few years earlier by a
Catholic to implicate Protestant nationalists. This situation was highly criticized by American
missionaries, who were accused by the Japanese as conspiring with the nationalists. As a result,
the heads of the “Presbyterian North Mission, U.S.A., the Methodist Episcopal Board of Foreign
Missions, and the Board of the Foreign Missions of the Methodist Church (South)” met with the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington, the Secretary of State, President Taft, and the Chief of the
Bureau of Foreign Affairs to discuss the situation in Korea. 171 The pressure missionaries put on
Governor-General Terauchi worked, as all who were accused and tortured were freed. However,
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the subsequent strict enforcement of the laws which prohibited freedom of speech and freedom
of assembly demolished the nationalist wave that had been building until that point. Kenneth M.
Wells, a historian and an expert of Korean Protestant nationalism, has described the 1910s as the
“Dark Ages” for Korean independence activists who remained in Korea. 172 Nevertheless, the
1912-1913 Annual Report emphatically denied any allegations of religious discrimination or
torture, and again asserted that only legitimate propagation of religion would be given protection.
In 1915, Governor-General Terauchi created general regulations for religious propagation
which “provided rules for the ways and means of proper religious propagation.”173 These
regulations required that any new missionaries had to report to the Governor-General, who
would consider their methods of propagation and could order changes to be made in them.
Revised education regulations were also imposed in private schools, regulations which required
that religious teaching be excluded from curricula. However, private schools maintained by
missionaries did not have to conform to these revised regulations immediately, as the
enforcement of them would have caused “considerable inconvenience.”174 Thus, they were
allowed a ten year grace period where they could adjust to the new provisions. During this time,
missionaries were able to continue teaching and running private schools.
While missionaries cannot be credited as the single driving force behind the March First
Movement, their contribution to Korean education and thought cannot be ignored. Bringing their
Western ideals with them to Korea, Protestant missionaries sought to educate the Korean people
and achieved that throughout the first decade of colonization. They provided western education
to Korean youth, which was greatly expanded during the 1905 education movement. The
educational work of large Protestant missions created a loyalty to the church and Christianity,
which was often expressed through various forms of patriotic sentiment. Consequently,
missionaries and Japanese authorities continuously fought over education.175 Missionaries also
advocated for Koreans, as demonstrated through the “Conspiracy Case.” While Koreans may not
have been able to fathom building their own nation-state in the early years of colonization,
missionaries instilled ideas of Western liberal thought among all classes of Koreans. These
Western thoughts transformed into a form of Korean nationalism based in anti-Japanese
sentiment. As a result, the Protestant private schools “gave every appearance of being organs for
the propagation of national thought.”176
The growing anti-Japanese sentiment was evident among the steady rise of Korean
publications during the first decade of colonization. Between 1910 and 1919, “the publication of
books on all subjects increased, and a total of thirty-three Korean language magazines received
permits” to publish from the colonial government.177 While magazines were required to restrict
their subject matter to non-political topics only, three magazines in particular became prominent
public forums for the growing nationalist movement in Korea. These three magazines,
Ch’ŏndogyo Monthly (Ch’ŏndogyo wŏlbo, 1910-1913), Boys (Sonyŏn, 1908-1911), Youth
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(Ch’ŏngch’un, 1914-1918) began encountering censorship issues, but still reached many Koreans
during printing.178
The Japanese paranoia about missionaries in Korea began before the March First
Movement and was apparent after its suppression. On January 7, 1919, the Japan Advertiser
published an interview with Dr. Ramakichi Nakajima, a professor at the Imperial University, in
which Dr. Nakajima stated,
“There can be little doubt that the American missionaries are behind the independence
movement of the Koreans.”179 This excerpt was sent from the Consul General at Seoul to the
secretaries of the American Mission Stations in Korea. Even before the Movement began, the
Japanese were suspicious of missionary involvement in an independence movement. Concerned,
the Consul General enclosed a circular letter by the American Minister Resident and Consul
General at Seoul, on May 11, 1897, to all Americans in Korea, which implored them to not
participate in the domestic affairs of Korea.180 Clearly, the Consul General was concerned with
the accusation made in the Japan Advertiser and wanted missionaries to be reminded not to
involve themselves in any political issues. Despite Japanese suspicions about missionaries and
oppressive educational practices, missionary private schools that had survived the colonial
transition became key instruments of a Korean national education that helped create the March
First Movement.
Post-WWII International Ideology
As Korea reached its first decade under Japanese colonial rule, President Woodrow
Wilson gave his Fourteen Points speech to Congress on January 18, 1918. During his speech, he
articulated the principle of self-determination. Wilson’s speech is significant in terms of the
March First Movement, not only because of its content but also because of the timing of the
Movement itself.
Wilson’s speech detailed the need for a “free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial
adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must
have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined”181
This idea was going to be guiding the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, which took
place only a few months prior to the March First Movement. This was certainly not the first
self-determination had been discussed in an international context, as in 1915, “numerous peace
organizations [had] recognized the right to self-determination.”182 These organizations included
the International Peace Bureau, the World Peace Foundation and the Dutch Anti-War Council.
Additionally, Vladimir Lenin had published his The Right of Nations to Self-Determination in
1914. However, Wilson’s speech had brought this concept onto the international stage, and even
further, had recognized that without self-determination, sustainable world peace could not be
achieved. In his speech, he explained, “An evident principle runs through the whole program I
have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live
on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless
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this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand.”183
Thus, Wilson’s position as U.S. President had allowed him to make it clear internationally that a
world without war required self-determination.
Additionally, Wilson’s speech famously recognized a need for “a general association of
nations.”184 The right of self-determination needed an organization that would ensure its
recognition and enforcement. The Korean delegates’ experience at the Hague in 1907
demonstrated this need for a new international tribunal that could rectify the resentment Korea
had towards Japan. After Wilson’s address to Congress, Korea submitted petitions to both
President Wilson, specifically, and the organized international community in Paris, just as it had
attempted to do in 1907.185 Rhee Syngman, Henry Chung, and Min Chan-ho, representatives of
the Korean National Association (founded in San Francisco in 1909), submitted a plea to
President Wilson. In February 1919, Rhee and Chung petitioned the Paris Peace Conference, also
via the Korean National Association. In China, nationalists had formed the New Korea Youth
Corps and sent member Kim Kyu-sik to Paris to appeal for the self-determination of Korea. Kim
submitted two petitions “protesting the injustice of Japanese colonialism in Korea and asking for
help to achieve independence,” but all three petitions were ignored.186 This last rejection from the
international community ended Korea’s hopes of international support and pushed the March
First Movement forward.
The March First Movement
As mentioned before, the March First Movement was strategically timed with the
national mourning of King Kojong, and now coincided with the negotiations of the Paris Peace
Conference. This was the opportune time for Korea to make itself known.
Immediately prior to the March First Movement, a Korean detective from Seoul, Shin
Seung Hee, visited the Ch’ŏndogyo printing house. The Ch’ŏndogyo, or Religion of Heavenly
Way, had developed out of the crushed Tonghak followers and was now a organized religion with
an extensive cultural program that included the publishing of the national newspaper
Independence News.”187 When visiting the printing house, Shin discovered that it had received
the newly written Declaration of Independence on February 27th, and had been tasked with
printing 21,000 copies. Surprisingly, Shin did not report this discovery to his Japanese superiors
and subsequently fled with money the Ch’ŏndogyo provided him for travel. Not much else is
known about him, other than he was captured and killed by the Japanese.188
One can only speculate about the motivations behind Detective Shin’s staying quiet,
whether it was because of a bribe or a change of heart. Regardless, his story is an example of
trust and individual agreement that surely countless other individuals involved in the March First
Movement experienced, which further enabled the Movement to even happen. The lack of trust
in international relations at this time, and “most notably in the fact that agreements with Korea
were neither honored by Japan nor by many other nations,” could have contributed to the trust
the organizers of the Movement had to place in one another, and in Wilson’s principle of
self-determination.189 While Korean petitioners were ignored at the Paris Peace Conference,
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Wilson’s Fourteen Points had raised the standards of international morality and set the stage for
Korea to incite an independence movement.190
The independence movement began on March 1, 1919 in Seoul with the proclamation of
the Declaration of Independence and street demonstrations. The Declaration of Independence
was signed by thirty-three Korean religious figures, comprised of fifteen Ch’ŏndogyo, fifteen
Christians, and three Buddhists.191 Religious groups took on the full responsibility of the
planning because only churches were prepared with enough infrastructure for mobilization and
communication. As described at the outset, the signers met at the T’aehwagwan restaurant in
Seoul to promulgate the Declaration they had signed prior, and the Declaration was also read
aloud to a crowd mainly of students in Pagoda Park nearby. The crowd subsequently marched
through the streets, waving Korean flags and shouting “Tongnip manse!” (Long live Korean
independence!)192 This Movement quickly spread worldwide, amassing over two million Korean
participants who demonstrated in 1500 protests.193 After the signers voluntarily surrendered to
authorities, the March First Movement was left without any official leaders. Activists began
asserting that “Korea had declared its independence, representatives were in Paris to argue for
self-determination at the peace conference, and their efforts must be supported by demonstrations
in Korea to repudiate Japanese rule.”194 In demanding this, the activists had capitalized on the
educated’s existing mass consciousness against the oppressive Governor-General, and large
masses of Koreans clearly immediately responded to this appeal. As the demonstrations spread,
what once was a peaceful effort quickly turned violent. Not only was the Movement suppressed
brutally by the Japanese Governor-General, but in multiple areas peaceful demonstrations were
suppressed by authorities who used force, and resulted in violent counterattacks on Japanese
gendarmes and police.195 Some protests even turned violent without impetus from Japanese
authorities. By late March and early April of 1919, the end of the first stage of the Movement,
areas of Korea were in open, bloody rebellion.196 This initial period was defined by the hundreds
of thousands of Korean participants whose actions ranged from peaceful protest to violent
assaults in their open political effort for independence.
An official report from the Japanese Foreign Office on March 7th stated that "most of the
rioters are Christian students, ignorant malcontents, and lower class laborers and behind them is
understood to have been standing missionaries of a certain country.”197 Protestant missionaries,
specifically American missionaries, were quickly accused by the Japanese as conspirators in the
March First Movement. On April 6, 1919, Japanese Ambassador Morris sent a correspondence to
the Acting Secretary of State describing that “Eli Miller Mowry, American of Presbyterian
mission [at] Pyengyang, [was] arrested for permitting Koreans to use his premises for printing
propaganda.”198 While Ambassador Morris continued by asserting that American missionaries
could not have inspired the Movement because they were “wholly ignorant of the population
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[sic] to inaugurate it,”199 he nevertheless described that the majority of unrest were in cities with
mission stations, and that American missionaries, who had the “closest possible relations with
their native converts,” had expressed antagonism about the methods used by the military
government in Korea.200 This exchange demonstrates some of the concerns the American
government had regarding the role of missionaries in the Movement. It also confirms that the
Japanese had believed some missionaries directly aided the Movement, through the printing and
distribution of Korean independence propaganda. About a week later, on April 14th, the Acting
Secretary of State replied to Ambassador Morris and cautioned the Consulate at Seoul to act with
great precaution and restraint “with specific cases involving Americans as they may arise.” to
assure the Japanese that the American government was not involved and did not sympathize with
Korean nationalist actions.201 The American government was clearly very hesitant in its actions
and response, as it did not want to offend the Japanese, nor assume any responsibility for the
events that occurred. The rest of the international community followed suit, and no official
support from any country was given to the Movement.
The large scale and coordination of the Movement stunned the Governor-General, who
quickly responded to the effort with harsh repression. This violent period resulted in over 7,500
demonstrators being killed, 16,000 wounded, and 46,000 arrested. On April 15th, the cruelest
incident occurred just south of Seoul, where Japanese authorities locked worshipers gathered
inside a church and burned them alive.202 The brutality of the Movement and the massive Korean
struggle was communicated to the world primarily through Western missionary channels.
Specifically, reports from American missionaries poured into the U.S. government. While strong
international criticism was incited, no official response was given by the international
community.203
In 1920, the Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the
Church of Christ in America released two volumes of The Korean Situation: Authentic Accounts
of Recent Events. These books contained eyewitness accounts from both American and British
missionaries that described the horrors Koreans endured during the March First Movement and
provided new insights into the Movement. In the foreword of Volume I, it states,
The Commission wishes to state with utmost clearness that as a Commission it is not
concerning itself with the political questions involved in the Korean Independence
Movement. Whether or not Korea should be granted political independence is not a
question upon which it is called to express judgment. The Commission is, however,
concerned with all right-minded men that brutality, torture, inhuman treatment, religious
persecution, and massacre shall cease everywhere. The evidence of the wide prevalence
of such deeds in Korea has become convincing.204
Similar to the American government, the Commission was reluctant to even address the question
of Korea’s independence that the Movement raised. The Commission would not even wholly
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condemn the Japanese government. The Commission, however, did criticize the methods of
colonization the Japanese government used and called upon Americans to “give the strongest
possible moral support to the progressive and anti-militaristic movements” in Korea, and states
that hope for Korea “and indeed for China and the whole world lies in the overthrow of
militarism in Japan.”205 This demonstrates the kind of thinking about self-determination that had
developed, and the Commission illustrated the March First Movement almost as an example of
Wilson’s principle in their report.
Comparing the “Japanese military system” used to stop demonstrators to the “Prussian
machine which was recently smashed in Europe,” the Commission reported on March 21, 1919
that one newspaper had described that six thousand Koreans were in jail. The Commission
explained that the Movement at this date was countrywide and included Christians, the
Ch’ŏndogyo, and Buddhists. Students of the public schools Japan had established in Korea were
“equally involved with those of Mission schools,” and “countless offenses against humanity”
were being committed daily.206 After giving a brief history of the Japanese colonial system and
reform tendencies, the Commission had a section dedicated to the “Genesis of the Korean
Independence Movement.”207 This section goes into detail of the growing independence
movement in Korea, beginning with the Paris Peace Conference.
According to the first volume, a group of missionaries had met with the Minister of
Internal Affairs of the Governor-General, during which they were informed that “a Korean had
interviewed President Wilson before he had left for Paris, and asked the President if he would
bring up the question of Korea at the Conference.”208 Wilson allegedly responded that the
Conference was only for countries that were affected by the war, and consequently the question
of “a country at peace as Korea” could not be properly raised. The interviewer then asked if
Korea would be discussed at the Conference if Koreans showed their unmistakable
dissatisfaction, to which Wilson responded that “he would not say that it could not be.”209 This
account contradicts what many scholars have written about Korea’s failed appeal at the Paris
Peace Conference. Scholars tend to only describe how the petitions at the Conference were
ignored and do not mention an interview with Wilson. Additionally, the report describes that
Korean students who were attending various colleges in Japan started a movement for the
self-determination of Korea during February. This resulted in many of the students being
arrested. Because of this, principals of schools “were called before the Prefect at the City Hall”
and told to warn their students not to be “led away by the actions of the Korean students in
Japan.”210 While the Japanese had their suspicions about a movement occurring, the size and
organization of the Movement was actually what shocked them.
The accounts of the major events from March 1st are generally consistent, that the signers
had gathered and then turned themselves in, and a crowd in Pagoda Park began a demonstration
through the streets of Seoul. After the signers of the Declaration were arrested, the Japanese
police “published in the newspapers that they had surrounded the ring leaders in an eating house
as they were drinking success to their plot.”211 As the crowd walked through Seoul, the
Commission described that not a “single act of violence was done. At one point mounted
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gendarmes charged the crowd and inflicted some sabre cuts.”212 That evening and the next day,
Japanese police were making as many arrests as possible, with official press reports releasing
that missionaries were responsible for inciting the Movement because of the number of Christian
demonstrators. Allegedly, Japanese “police reporters played up the Christian schools and glossed
over the facts in regard to the participation of the government school students and the
Buddhists.” The American Consul eventually demanded that the Japanese government discredit
the accusations against missionaries, but the police reports and press still continued to print
them.213
The Commission also described that missionaries were attacked during the Movement,
and their homes were often searched by Japanese police immediately after the demonstrations
began. For example, on March 20th, “Rev. John Thomas, a missionary of the Oriental
Missionary Society, was attacked by soldiers at Kokei, and severely beaten. When he produced
his British passpower, it was thrown on the ground and stamped on, as was also a preaching
permit which had been given to him by the authorities.”214 Detailed accounts also were given
about protestors, describing that on March 22nd, another street demonstration took place in
Seoul where it was quickly dispersed by authorities. That evening, demonstrations began in
several different parts of the city, and “bayonets were freely used and many were wounded.”215
According to the Commission, Seoul was under martial law from March 1st to at least the 22nd,
with the city being patrolled by soldiers. With missionaries reporting these stories worldwide, the
the Seoul Press ran a couple of editorial articles alleging that Koreans were “atrocious liars” and
that prison authorities had assured them that no tortures were taking place. A missionary
purportedly showed an article to a Japanese civilian who replied that the report meant there had
been no tortures since demonstrators arrived in prison. Another foreigner discussed “the editorial
with the editor of the paper” who described that while he knew there were cruelties taking place,
the articles were “speaking officially.”216
These compilation of these firsthand accounts provide the missionary perspective on the
March First Movement. While at the time of publishing, the Commission was clearly unsure of
how the Movement would ensue, the public reporting of the harsh Japanese suppression was
intended to ensure that “every possible influence may be brought to bear for the protection of
Koreans from inhuman treatment and injustice” and that an enlightened public opinion would be
developed that would “strengthen the progressive, anti-militaristic forces in Japan in their efforts
to secure justice and fair dealing in Korea.”217 Regardless, the Commission admired the genuine
resistance of the Korean people, and described Japan’s colonial system as an effort to exploit a
people and benefit them… [and] impose ‘culture’ against the desires of a people with a culture of
its own.218 The Commission assured that regardless of the outcome of the Movement, the
publicity these compilations would bring would help “both Korea and Japan in their ascent to a
higher plane of civilization,” still viewing both Korea and Japan as inferior states.219
Despite missionaries’ disseminating information about the Movement and its brutal
suppression, the efforts of the March First Movement had clearly failed to achieve enough
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support for Korea from the international community. Without that support, the Japanese were
able to maintain their colonial grip on Korea until the end of World War II. Independence for
Korea was not achieved until that time.
Immediate Effects in Korea: The Cultural Reform
The March First Movement nevertheless resulted in a few immediate effects in Korea.
The Movement had forced the Japanese to reassess and modify their colonial policies in Korea.
World War I had also brought a more liberal current in Japanese politics, with the inauguration of
the Hara Kei cabinet in 1918. Hara was a civilian party politician in Japan who “revealed his
distaste for military-oriented colonial rule in Korea.”220 In August 1919, Japan announced that
Governor-General Hasegawa Yoshimichi (whose harsh rule had taken over in 1916) would be
replaced by the “softer appearance” of Admiral Saito Makoto’s rule. Saito instilled policy
changes known as the “Cultural Policy.”221
Similar to Terauchi Masatake, Governor-General Hasegawa was known to have an
extremely discriminatory and harsh view of Korean people in general. When he was replaced, it
was customary for the outgoing governor to leave a personally written report for the incoming
successor. His report included his recommendations, and reflected the Japanese authorities’
perspectives regarding colonial policy after the Movement.
In the report, Hasegawa assured that Japan had not “willfully adopted policies that [were]
unfair to the Koreans.”222 However, he described the need to change to a more gradual
assimilation policy in order to have a smoother governance in the future. His statements almost
blame the local Japanese who were in charge of enforcing the colonial policies, describing,
“those people charged with the actual work of implementing assimilation [were] apt to seek
hasty results” despite the gradualist colonial approach being “abundantly clear.”223 Hasegawa
went on to explain the importance of naturally unifying thought between Japanese and Koreans,
and argued that the immediate steps taken should be to “(1) strengthen the economic ties linking
Koreans and Japanese, making them indissoluble, and (2) promote schools and social education,
further opportunities for Koreans and Japanese to study together and the spread of the Japanese
language, encourage immigration from the home islands, and open the door to mixed
marriages.”224 He then addresses the motivations behind the Japanese colonization stating that
“this union” was for the “survival of both peoples” and that anyone criticizing the “protective
actions” of the government was misunderstanding Japan’s intentions.225
Hasegawa further explained that the unequal treatment between Japanese and Koreans
had been a concern for Japan since the annexation, and was repeatedly discussed with Japanese
administrators. He contended that as a result of this repeated discussion, Japanese attitudes
toward Koreans had recently greatly improved, but that “many still show contempt for
Koreans.”226 Again, he deflected the blame to the local Japanese and disregarded the
discrimination that had been systematically built in to the colonial system. Hasegawa also
addressed the education system in colonial Korea, because so many students had participated in
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the Movement. Education was a “key foundation for the gradual Japanization of this presently
unstable society,” and Hasegawa stressed the importance of increasing educational opportunities
for Koreans. To him, people who thought the spread of education would stimulate political
thought in Koreans were ignoring the fact that leaving Koreans on their own would encourage
“moral decay.”227
When Governor-General Saito’s new Cultural Policy was put into place, some reforms
followed Hasegawa’s “Recommendations.” This new policy had six major changes: the
Governor-General would now be appointed from admirals or active-duty generals; freedom of
speech, assembly, press, and association was allowed with limitations; the gendarmerie police
system was replaced by the ordinary police system; and government officials and school teachers
were no longer required to wear uniforms or carry swords; educational opportunities for Koreans
were expanded; and Korean cultural self-expression was allowed more freedom. These changes
were significant because they demonstrate how the Movement had forced the Japanese to
respond by easing restrictions on the Korean people. While some scholars believe these changes
were superficial, Hasegawa’s insights shed some light on what Japanese colonial rulers were
thinking and planning during this tumultuous period.
In December of 1921, Governor-General Saito released his Annual Report on Reforms
and Progress in Chosen 1918-1921. Totalling over 270 pages, the Report detailed the structural
changes of the Cultural Policy and the Movement. The language of the Report is more significant
though, as Korean demonstrators were described throughout the report as “malcontents” who
often organized violent crimes. In the Public Peace and Order section for example, Saito explains
that since the Movement, rumors of Korean malcontents “abroad would send many men secretly
into the country and blow up government building and railways in hope of thus gathering
strength for their Movement.”228 While the report describes that nothing came of these rumors,
they demonstrate the Korean discrimination that continued to exist after the March First
Movement.
Conclusion
The March First Movement was instilled by a combination of various influences: the
harsh and structured colonization that Korea had been enduring under Japan since 1910, the
spread of anti-imperialist global ideology after World War I, and the prior establishment of
Protestant missionaries and education throughout Korea. There is not a single driving force
behind the March First Movement as without one of these components, the Movement may have
not occurred when it did.
After a history of unequal treaties being forced on Japan, the Japanese in turn targeted
Korea shortly following the Meiji Restoration. Emulating Western techniques, Japan opened
Korea through the Unyō Incident, which resulted in the Treaty of Kanghwa. Even though Japan’s
influence was never welcomed into Korea, from that year on, Japan and China competed over
influence. The Military Mutiny of 1882 and the Tonghak Peasant Uprising highlighted the
competition over Korea between these two countries and eventually led to the First
Sino-Japanese War. This war was the first time Japan was acknowledged as a civilized society in
international law, and the need to prove that title motivated the Japanese during the war.
Ultimately, Japan was awarded Taiwan after defeating the Japanese.
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The Russo-Japanese War followed, and during the time in between the two wars, Japan
focused on increasing influence in Korea. After a decisive victory, Japan had removed its last
major threat to its dominant power position in Korea and acquired Korea as a protectorate. In
response, Korea sent three representatives to the Hague in hopes of appealing to the international
community. This was the first of three non-violent attempts Korea set forth to request help from
the international community. When that appeal failed, Korea became an official Japanese colony.
The first decade of Japanese colonization was defined by the harsh rule of
Governor-General Terauchi Masatake. The policies were discriminatory, destructive, and
structured in a systemic way that was inescapable for Koreans. Koreans were politically
suppressed, in a society that had no free speech, free press, suffrage, or representative
government. The Japanese stole large agricultural plots of land from Koreans through a cadastral
survey that required Korean citizens to report their landholdings to the new Land Survey Bureau.
This “reform” allowed the Governor-General to confiscate land from those who failed to report
and register their land in the short period of time provided. Subsequently, Governor-Generals
sold the land at much less than it was worth to Japanese companies who produced huge profits
off the land. While Korean citizens were forced off their lands, Japanese companies and
Governor-Generals became great and powerful landowners who provided profits for Japan.
Industrial and agricultural production in Korea was designated to only serve Japan’s needs.
Japanese companies exploited the natural resources of Korea with the generous backing of the
Governor-General. Because of these favorable conditions, Japanese companies were able to
monopolize Korea’s natural resources, industries, and finances for their benefit. As Japanese
companies were profiting, Korean businesses struggled to obtain enough capital to survive.
Finally, a highly authoritarian, centralized government was created and harshly enforced by an
abundant military police force. The Japanese colonization of Korea was meant to rule and exploit
the colony for Japanese interests, with the Governor-General spearheading this effort. These
brutal policies reinforced a national consciousness, both domestically and foreignly, amongst all
classes against Japanese rule, ultimately contributing to the development of the March First
Movement.
The presence of Protestant missionaries in Korea further strengthened Korea’s national
consciousness through Westernized education. Because Western missionaries during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were believers in the supremacy of Western civilization,
they became effective and committed operatives of Westernization. They taught Korean youth
Western learning, imported and sold Western tools, and published newspapers. Missionaries were
also able to capitalize on the low literacy rate in Korea, and Christianity became associated with
the dissemination of reading. Their mission education was soon opened to every possible
convert, and missionaries began establishing a substantial number of schools in Korea. By 1905,
the country-wide movement for “education for the nation” had taken over Korea and mission
work had effectively covered the country. Western-style subjects were taught in private
missionary schools, giving Koreans the opportunity to learn about subjects that had been
excluded by the Japanese. There was a huge expansion of Westernized education and
Christianity in Korea until the annexation. Through this education, and the education that
continued after the annexation, missionaries became a significant contributor to the national
consciousness of the March First Movement despite being under the watchful eye of the
Japanese.
Finally, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech resonated with young
Korean nationalists, recognizing that self-determination was needed to create a sustainable world
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peace. Wilson’s vision pushed Koreans to attempt two more non-violent appeals to the
international community. After Wilson’s speech, Rhee Syngman, Henry Chung, and Min
Chan-ho, representatives of the Korean National Association, submitted a plea to President
Wilson, and later petitioned the Paris Peace Conference. In China, nationalists had formed the
New Korea Youth Corps and sent member Kim Kyu-sik to Paris to appeal for the
self-determination of Korea. All three petitions were ignored, and this last rejection from the
international community ended Korea’s possibility of international support and pushed the
March First Movement forward.
The March First Movement was a culmination of these factors; specifically, Japan’s
influence was never welcomed or accepted by Korea, so the combination of harsh Japanese
colonization practices, anti-imperial global ideology after WWI, and the establishment of
Protestant missionaries in Korea all contributed to the development and creation of an
independence movement that quickly spread throughout the entire country. Each one of these
influences helped determine when the Movement occurred, and why it occurred. This study is
filled with the admirable resistance efforts of the Korean people against Japanese imperialism,
starting with the Tonghak Peasant Uprising and lasting until the end of the March First
Movement. The power and impact of the March First Movement cannot be overstated, because
the Movement directly influenced the creation of the Korean Provisional Government in
Shanghai. The Provisional Government was created as a republic, guaranteeing the people an
elected government, “freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion; and separation of state
and religion.”229 While this entity was weakened by the distance from Korea, a lack of
international support, and the ideological left-right split among nationalists after the Bolshevik
Revolution, this was a government that could lawfully work for Korea’s independence. Without
the March First Movement, that achievement may have never developed. The current
government of the Republic of Korea today prides itself on successfully obtaining the legitimacy
of the former Korean Provisional Government, a product of Korea’s noble fight for independence
in the March First Movement.
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